Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's controversial decision to introduce casinos as part of the "remaking" of Singapore's economy was accompanied by officially tolerated public criticism of that decision. Yet, other attempts at organized protests and political expression on a range of issues were subjected to the customary suppression that underlines the government's continued resistance to political pluralism.
The government's handling of the debate over casinos suggested that Lee's rhetoric wasn't entirely hollow. Not only did government-controlled media offer uncharacteristic space for criticism of the casinos idea but a measure of protest by non-governmental organizations was also tolerated. This included initiatives of Families Against the Casino Threat in Singapore (FACTS), whose online petition quickly attracted 29,000 names and identity-card numberssignificant in a country where fear of political retribution from the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) remains high. In October the government put its draft Casino Control Bill online to receive public feedback.
However, there were special considerations in the casino controversy. Not only was opposition too extensive to completely dismiss, but also casinos are a sensitive issue among socially conservative supporters of the PAP. Gaming is not a cause cle'bre among liberal reformers. The government has been especially keen to avoid alienating ethnic Malays whose opposition to casinos is based on Islamic grounds. Ironically, then, Prime Minister Lee demonstrated in 2005 that some of the basic imperatives supposedly acting against political liberalism-religious and ethnic sensitivities-could be managed by greater tolerance of criticism and opposition. However, this concession was neither extended to liberal critics of the PAP nor to others attempting to circumvent established social and political controls.
Internet weblogs (or blogs), for instance, came in for thematic scrutiny by authorities. By their nature, blogs pose a problem for control over Internet usage: they lack moderators, system administrators, and web content managers for authorities to monitor, filter, or warn. The blog of Chen Jiahao, former beneficiary of a government scholarship to study at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign awarded by the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR) was at the center of one controversy. Chen criticized the scholarships as overly restrictive, contending that scholarship holders were being managed as economic resources rather than as human beings. In response, A*STAR's chairman, Philip Yeo, threatened a defamation suit unless Chen apologized. Chen acceded to Yeo's demands and shut down his blog. The Parisbased group Reporters without Borders observed, "Such intimidation could make the country's blogs as timid and obedient as the traditional media."3 Other blogging controversies included the "flaming" (insulting) of school teachers by students, resulting in suspensions and blog removals.4 The strongest reminder from authorities that this medium was not immune from existing laws came in response to racist remarks against ethnic Malays. The Sedition Act-not used since 1966-was invoked to convict Benjamin Koh, 27, and Nicholas Lim, 25, the former sentenced to a month's jail and the latter jailed for a day and fined US$3,000.
It The year also witnessed attempts by some of the PAP's opponents to challenge select government policies, laws, and aspects of governance through informal political action, emphasizing peaceful protest and at times civil disobedience. Cherian George has argued that the PAP's political success owes much to "calibrated coercion" in managing dissent,5 with coercion selective and targeted rather than general and crude. But in the face of this new protest strategy, authorities' repressive reflexes were highlighted, rendering the political regime's coercive elements ever more visible.
In May, for instance, authorities barred the Thai international expert on nonviolent protest Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan from entering Singapore to speak to this topic, arguing that "Singapore's politics are reserved for Singaporeans." Similar reactions were aroused by protests over the death penalty following the sentencing to death of Shanmugam Murugesu, a sole parent of teenage twins who was convicted of possessing one kilogram of marijuana. The city-state has one of the highest per capita levels of executions in the world, with more than 400 prisoners hanged since 1991. Authorities barred Amnesty International from speaking in April at a forum opposing the death penalty and the use of Shanmugam's image in publicity material advertising an August protest concert.
It was also in August that a dozen anti-riot squad police wearing helmets and knee-high protective gear and armed with shields and batons formed a Singapore government. However, ultimately the close ties developed between Canberra and Singapore in recent years didn't carry much weight and Nguyen was hanged on December 2.
In the process of the controversy, Singapore's image in Australia for bureaucratic efficiency and meticulous attention to detail by its political leaders suffered. After making a private plea to Lee Hsien Loong during the APEC meeting in South Korea, Australian Prime Minister John Howard had to learn from reporters that Nguyen's mother was already in receipt of the Singapore government's decision letter. By this time, opposition foreign affairs spokesperson Kevin Rudd asserted that Australians had been treated with contempt.8 The Singapore government's refusal to allow Nguyen's mother to hug her son before the execution was also criticized by Howard as "clinical" and "disappointing." Although he ruled out any diplomatic action against Singapore and did not encourage boycotts against Singapore goods, Howard predicted that the execution "will have an effect on the relationship on a people-to-people, population-to-population basis. 
